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We study the cryptographic primitive Oblivious Transfer ; a composable construc-
tion of this resource would allow arbitrary multi-party computation to be carried out in
a secure way, i.e. to compute functions in a distributed way while keeping inputs from
different parties private [1–3]. First we review a framework that allows us to analyze
composability of classical and quantum cryptographic protocols in special relativity:
Abstract Cryptography [4] instantiated by Causal Boxes [5, 6]. We then (1) explore
and formalize different versions of oblivious transfer found in the literature, (2) prove
that their equivalence holds also in relativistic quantum settings, (3) show that it is
impossible to composably construct any of these versions of oblivious transfer from
only classical or quantum communication among distrusting agents in relativistic set-
tings, (4) prove that the impossibility also extends to multi-party computation, and (5)
provide a mutual construction between oblivious transfer and bit commitment.
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1 Introduction
We address composable security of cryptographic protocols: that is, to go beyond stand-alone
security proofs and ensure that protocols are also secure when combined and composed with one
another [4, 7]. In multiparty cryptography, we assume that any agent involved in a protocol may
behave dishonestly, and try to build cryptographic resources robust against such behaviour. It is
known to be impossible for mutually distrusting agents to build many desirable resources using
only classical or quantum communication [8–12].
Bit commitment and oblivious transfer. There are two specially important two-party cryp-
tographic primitives: bit commitment and oblivious transfer. Intuitively, in the former, the sender
has to commit to a bit (commit phase), and then open the commitment at a later time (opening
phase). The receiver cannot learn any information about the committed bit before the open phase,
and the sender cannot change the value of the bit after the commit phase. Oblivious transfer
consists of sending a number of messages to the receiver without knowing which of the messages
are received. One version is the so-called 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer, where the sender inputs two
bits, and the receiver secretly chooses one of them, acquiring no information about the other one.
We will formalize and discuss these primitives in later sections of this work.
Known constructive results. These two primitives are complete (in the quantum setting)
for arbitrary secure multi-party computation, i.e. a secure implementation of either of these two
primitives can be used as a subroutine to implement complex primitives computing arbitrary
functions. Kilian [1] first proved this for oblivious transfer in a classical setting,; his work was
extended by Ishai et al. [2] who found a general construction for an efficient multi-party protocol,
removing the assumption of honest majority. These results were shown to also hold in the quantum
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setting by Unruh [3]. In the same work, Unruh presented a quantum protocol achieving oblivious
transfer using bit commitment, thus proving completeness of the latter in the quantum setting.
Known impossibility results. Canetti and Fischlin [8] showed that bit commitment is im-
possible in a classical, non-relativistic setting. Impossibility results for commitment protocols
were extended to the quantum non-relativistic setting independently by Mayers [9] and Lo and
Chau [10, 11]. Finally, a recent work by Vilasini et al. [6] showed that quantum bit commit-
ment cannot be securely constructed even under relativistic constraints. Oblivious transfer was
also proven to be impossible in non-relativistic settings: Lo [12] showed that arbitrary one-sided
two-party computation cannot achieve the desired security properties and, as a corollary, oblivious
transfer cannot be securely constructed, even in the quantum setting.
Taking special relativity into account. Since quantum effects do not suffice to achieve se-
curity in multi-party computation, recent works try to also exploit constraints given by special
relativity, like the maximum speed of light for propagation of messages: for example, Kent [13, 14]
proposed two relativistic protocols for bit commitment. However, the impossibility result proved
by Vilasini et al. [6] also implies their non-composability. In the same work, Vilasini et al. showed
that, under the assumption that a channel with delay is possible (i.e. a channel that ensures a cer-
tain time interval between sending and receipt of a message), a (time-bounded) bit commitment
protocol is possible, at least in principle. The possibility of Oblivious Transfer was left as an open
question. A complete cryptographic framework that takes into account both quantum theory and
special relativity is also relevant in the context of quantum communication in space [15–17].
On composability of security. In order for these results to be relevant in practical applications,
we need a theoretical notion of security that ensures composability : a cryptographic primitive has
to keep its security guarantees even when used in a broader context (e.g. many instances of the
primitive are executed in parallel). For example, stand-alone security of a protocol is not enough
to ensure that the protocol is not vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks, where dishonest agents
could run two instances of the protocol in parallel and create undesirable correlations between the
outputs. In order to model composability in a general way, Canetti [7] developed the Universally
Composable framework, where parties are represented as a network of machines exchanging mes-
sages, in the presence of a corrupting adversary and an environment that acts as a distinguisher.
Protocols that are secure with respect to this framework can be proven to achieve strong security
guarantees. Ben-Or and Mayers [18] and Unruh [3] proposed an extension of the Universally Com-
posable framework to the quantum setting. More recently, Maurer and Renner [4] developed an
alternative, the Abstract Cryptography framework, which we use extensively throughout this work.
The top-down approach used in this framework allows us to implement resources and protocols as
Causal Boxes [5], which gives us enough expressive power to model not only quantum protocols,
but also relativistic ones, in a straightforward but general way. This approach was originally ex-
plored by Vilasini et al. [6], and our paper can be seen as an application to other primitives. We
review the Abstract Cryptography framework in Section 2.
Contributions of this paper. In this work, we use the Abstract Cryptography framework to
formalize various versions of oblivious transfer found in the literature (Section 3.1). We proceed
by showing that the equivalence of all these versions (in the sense that they can be constructed
from each other in a composable way) holds also in the relativistic quantum setting (Section 3.2).
Then, our main result proves that all of these versions are impossible to construct without addi-
tional assumptions, by showing that a simple distinguisher is able to tell apart any construction
with constant probability (Sections 3.3). We show that these proofs of impossibility extend to
oblivious string transfer and to multi-party computation (Section 3.4). We conclude by showing
the equivalence between bit commitment and oblivious transfer in the relativistic quantum setting
(Section 3.5), allowing past and future work on minimal additional assumptions for bit commitment
to be easily extended to oblivious transfer. In the appendix, we present a more formal overview of
Abstract Cryptography (Appendix A) and of Causal Boxes, which allow us to model relativistic
quantum protocols (Appendix B). All proofs can be found in Appendix C.
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2 Overview of the Abstract Cryptography framework
In this section we briefly review the Abstract Cryptography (AC) framework developed by Maurer
and Renner [4]. A more formal review can be found in Appendix A; here we present an informal
recap with the ingredients needed to follow the rest of the paper. Note that while the framework
applies to general multipartite settings, in this summary we restrict ourselves to bipartite scenarios
with two mutually distrusting agents, Alice and Bob.
Motivation. Traditional theories of cryptography, built upon complexity and information the-
ory with a bottom-up approach, formalize primitives and give notions of security directly from
the underlying models of computation and communication. This makes it harder to generalize
constructions and security to a different setting (for example, upgrading from classical to quan-
tum communication channels). In contrast, the AC framework follows a top-down approach: it
defines primitives and protocols as abstract objects (resources) in a pseudo-metric space, where
the chosen pseudo-metric depends on the notion of security we would like to use, and then lower
levels of abstraction should define what these objects are. In this way, cryptography is formalized
as a resource theory : a secure primitive is seen as a resource, and a protocol implementing such
primitive is said to construct that resource.
Cryptographic resources. The building blocks of the theory are ‘resources’: we can think of
them as trusted black boxes with interfaces that different agents can interact with and with a
reliable input/output behaviour. For example we could think of the resource R ‘addition’ which
takes in a bit a from Alice and a bit b from Bob and returns their sum a ⊕ b to both players at
a later time. Resources can be composed (for example one could connect some of the interfaces
of R to another resource), and the resource theory is about what we can build from elementary
building blocks, under cryptographic restrictions. Bit commitment and oblivious transfer are more
complex types of resources, called cryptographic primitives: in general, we want to know how the
black box behaves when both players are honest and when either of them is dishonest, and this is
formalized by a triple of resources, as follows.
Definition 2.1 (Primitive). A primitive is a triple of resources R = (R,RA, RB), where R is
a resource built by both honest Alice and Bob, and RA (resp. RB) is a resource built under the
assumption of dishonest Alice (resp. dishonest Bob).
Splitting a primitive into three resources allows us to define primitives that behave differently upon
dishonesty of one of the parties, which may be useful in some contexts where a primitive allowing
some extra power to dishonest parties is still ‘secure enough’ for us.
Protocols and constructions. Generally, we are interested in constructing resources from one
another. For example, suppose that Alice and Bob start from the above mentioned resource R
that returns a⊕ b to both agents, and wanted to use it to build a two-way communication channel
between the two, that is a resource S that takes as inputs a and b and outputs Alice’s bit a to
Bob, and Bob’s bit b to Alice. They can do this through a simple protocol: Alice’s protocol ΠA
consists of sending a to R, then receiving R’s output x = a ⊕ b, and summing her bit a again
locally to x, obtaining b. Bob’s protocol ΠB is analogous, allowing him to recover a. We will
represent this as ΠARΠB ≈ S, for some equivalence relation ≈ we will define later: resource S
can be emulated by the construction of R together with Alice’s protocol ΠA and Bob’s protocol
ΠB . We can think as the left side of R as Alice’s interface, where ΠA is plugged in, and the right
side as Bob’s (Figure 2.1). We will see several examples in later sections. In practice constructions
are often imperfect, and can only ‘approximate’ the desired resource. In order to quantify these
approximations and make statements we will denote with an equivalence relation ≈ε, we need an
operational measure of distinguishability between the two resources. We will define this now.
Distinguishing between resources. Intuitively, we would like to relate how close two resources
(say R and S) are, to how easy it is for someone to distinguish them. If Alice and Bob think





Figure 2.1: Bipartite resources and protocols. Here R is a shared cryptographic resource with interfaces
towards Alice (left) and Bob (right). Resources like R can be seen as trusted black boxes characterized by their
input/output behaviour. The arrows represent input and output messages. ΠA and ΠB represent protocols
implemented by Alice and Bob respectively. We may wonder whether the construction ΠA RΠB can emulate
another resource S for all practical purposes (including when it is a subroutine of a larger protocol). This will
be formalized ahead.
measured by how secure their key is from adversaries. In abstract cryptography, we model the
whole environment of a resource as a distinguisher, a device with two interfaces: the inner interface
attaches to all free interfaces of the observed resource, and the outer interface outputs a single bit.
We call this bit D[R] when the observed resource is R (Figure 2.2), and we can use it to define
distinguishability between R and S: intuitively, D manages to distinguish R from S when D[R]
and D[S] are different (e.g. D[R] = 0 and D[S] = 1 with high probability).
Definition 2.2 (Distinguishing advantage [19]). Given a distinguisher D and a resource set Ω,
the statistical advantage of D in distinguishing between two resources R,S ∈ Ω is defined as
dD(R,S) := |P (D[R] = 1)− P (D[S] = 1)| .




We use R ≈ε S to denote dD(R,S) ≤ ε. When ε = 0, we may also remove the subscript.
This distinguishability notion is similar to those in classical game-based theories of cryptography
(like in [20]), but crucially here we did not fix a particular class of distinguishers, and this gives
an extreme flexibility to the model. If we take D as the class of all possible distinguishers, we will
obtain a definition of perfect (information-theoretic) security. On the other hand, we can model
computational security by restricting D to efficient distinguishers: polynomial-time according to
some complexity structure, classical, quantum or non-signalling distinguishers, or distinguishers
with bounded memory, for example. It will be important for most proofs that dD is well-behaved
and in particular satisfies the triangle inequality.
Lemma 2.3 (Distinguishers induce a pseudo-metric [4]). For any set of distinguishers D, the
distinguishing advantage dD is a pseudo-metric in the space of resources, that is: it is symmetric,
satisfies the triangle inequality, and dD(R,R) = 0 for all resources.
Cryptographic security. We have all the ingredients to quantify how well Alice and Bob can
construct a primitive S starting from a primitive R and local protocols ΠA and ΠB . For complete-
ness, the emulation should work when both players are honest and when one of them is dishonest.
There is a subtlety for the dishonest case: for example when Alice is dishonest we only consider
RAΠB without Alice’s honest protocol (then we would be able to plug an arbitrary dishonest
behaviour Π̄A on the left), and the target resource is SA. However, these two constructions may
have different interfaces on Alice’s side (in the example above, a dishonest Alice could simply not
perform the sum a⊕x). To account for this we allow the distinguisher to simulate Alice’s behaviour
through a protocol σA, called a simulator.
Definition 2.4 (Cryptographic security [19]). Let D be a class of distinguishers, and P be a class




D[R] ∈ {0, 1}
vs S
D
D[S] ∈ {0, 1}
Figure 2.2: Distinguishers. In abstract cryptography, attackers and the general environment of a resource are
modelled by distinguishers. We use this tool to model how well a resource R can emulate another resource S.
For example, the distinguisher D can represent the larger cryptographic setting in which S would implement an
ideal subroutine, and R would be the resource constructed using a protocol.
A distinguisher D interacts with the resource, either R or S, and tries to identify which one it is. It covers all the
free interfaces of the resource and returns a bit on its outer interface (ideally D[R] = 0 and D[S] = 1). The suc-
cess of this task can be measured by the distinguishing advantage dD(R,S) = |P (D[R] = 1)− P (D[S] = 1)|,
which is 1 if D can perfectly distinguish the two resources, and 0 if D cannot tell them apart at all. This creates
a notion of proximity among resources that depends on the class of distinguishers used (e.g. classical, quantum,
memory/time-bounded, etc.).
primitive S = (S, SA, SB) from a primitive R = (R,RA, RB), with respect to classes D and P if
ΠA R ΠB ≈ε S,
∃ σA ∈ P : RA ΠB ≈ε σA SA,
∃ σB ∈ P : ΠA RB ≈ε SB σB .
The proximity is computed with respect to the distinguishing advantage dD. If ε = 0, we also say
that the construction is perfect. Another way to denote this is R Π−→ S.
The strength of this notion depends on two customizations: the class D of distinguishers considered,
and the class P of protocols from which we pick ΠA,ΠB , σA and σB . While it should be obvious it
is desirable that honest protocols be efficient, it is worth noticing that the simulators of dishonest
agents σA and σB should also be as simple as possible, since in a security argument a distinguisher
will have to run these components internally, and thus the complexity requirements of such attack
would also depend on the resources used by the protocols and simulators. This notion of security
is further discussed in Appendix A.
Relativistic quantum resources. Up to now the resources were unspecified, abstract objects.
In order to treat quantum cryptographic tasks in relativistic settings, we need to instantiate re-
sources as objects capable of processing quantum information in space-time. Causal boxes [19]
are suitable candidates: they are generalizations of quantum maps that also take into account
the space-time position of input and output messages. The causal box framework is described in
detail in Appendix B; in order to follow the rest of the paper, we only need an intuition. We can
think of each box as a closed physical experimental setup (like an optical table with mirrors and
beam splitters that implements some quantum operation on incoming photons) together with input
and output wires (like optical fiber cables) that connect boxes to one another. Roughly speaking,
wires transmit messages of the form (m,P ), where m is the message and P = (~x, t) is a point in
Minkowski space-time marking where and when the message arrived — that is, P is composed of
a 3D space position ~x and time t. See Figure 2.3 for an example. A point P is in the causal past
of another point Q (also denoted as P ≺ Q) if it is possible to reach Q from P by travelling at
the speed of light (for physicists, if Q is in the future light cone of P ). Both messages and their
positions are quantum states, and in particular the framework can handle receiving or sending
messages at a superposition of different times. Causal boxes must respect an internal causality
condition, which allows them to be composed with each other arbitrarily, and as such we can model
both basic resources and protocols as boxes.
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(a,RA)




(x = a⊕ b,QA)
(b, PB)
(x = a⊕ b,QB)
ΠB
(b, RB)
(a = x⊕ b, SB)
PA, PB ≺ QA, QB , Ri ≺ Pi, Qi ≺ Si.
Figure 2.3: Resources in spacetime. To model quantum cryptographic protocols in relativistic spacetime, we
implement resources as causal boxes [6, 19], which are quantum information-processing devices whose inputs
and outputs are of the form (m,P ) where m is a message (for example a quantum state) and P = (~x, t) its
position in spacetime. (More generally messages can arrive at a quantum superposition of different positions,
as described in Appendix B.)
In this example, R is a trusted resource that receives a bit a from Alice at position PA and a bit b from Bob at
position PB , and returns the sum x = a⊕ b to Alice (at position QA) and to Bob (at QB). The resource must
satisfy a simple causality condition: it can only return the outputs after it receives inputs, and not the other
way around. This is formalized by the first condition in red, PA, PB ≺ QA, QB , where the pre-order ≺ is given
by special relativity: QA and QB must be in the future light cones of both PA and PB .
If Alice wants to recover Bob’s bit b, she can apply a protocol ΠA in which she sums a to the output of R,
as x ⊕ a = b; Bob can act analogously on his side with a protocol ΠB to recover a. This new construction
ΠA RΠB is akin to a two-way communication channel between Alice and Bob; however we have not yet tested
if it is composably secure. Note that now extra causality conditions apply (Ri ≺ Pi and Qi ≺ Si, i ∈ {A,B}).
3 Results
3.1 Definitions of Oblivious Transfer
In this section we formally introduce oblivious transfer as a primitive. Different variants are found
in the literature; here we implement as causal boxes in the Abstract Cryptography framework,
and will later prove their equivalence in relativistic quantum settings. Unless otherwise noted, the
dishonest versions of a resource RA, RB are the same as the honest one, R. The causality conditions
are given in red besides the causal box representation. The original definition of oblivious transfer
was given by Rabin [21].
Definition 3.1 (Rabin Oblivious Transfer [21]). A Rabin Oblivious Transfer is a primitive OT R =
(OTR, OTRA , OTRB ). Alice sends a bit x, and Bob receives it with probability 12 (he is notified about
the failure). Alice cannot infer whether the bit was received.
OTR
(x, P ) (x/⊥, Q)
P ≺ Q




-OT, was introduced by
Kilian in its completeness proof [1].




-Oblivious Transfer is a primitive OT =
(OT,OTA, OTB). Alice sends two bits a0, a1, and Bob chooses a bit b. Bob then receives ab, Alice





(ab, Q) P0, P1, PB ≺ Q
Another version, called Randomized Oblivious Transfer, was used by Unruh [3].
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Definition 3.3 (Randomized Oblivious Transfer [3]). A Randomized Oblivious Transfer can be
defined as a primitive ROT = (ROT,ROTA, ROTB). Alice receives two bits s0, s1, chosen uni-
formly at random by the primitive. Bob sends a bit b, and receives only sb. Alice does not receive
information about b, and Bob does not receive information about s1−b. A dishonest Alice may be












P0, P1, PB ≺ Q
It is worth noticing that allowing a dishonest Alice to choose s0, s1 significantly weakens the
definition: if s0, s1 were chosen at random regardless of the honesty of the two parties, then one
can see that a coin flip (a notoriously impossible [6] primitive returning the same uniformly random
bit to both parties) can be easily constructed (say, using s0 as outcome). On the other hand, such
weakening is fundamental to achieve equivalence with the other versions of oblivious transfer, as
we will see in the next section.
3.2 Equivalence of Oblivious Transfer primitives
Now we show that the three primitives are equivalent even in a relativistic quantum setting, in
the sense that each of them can be constructed using secure (and composable) instances of the
other two, either perfectly or with an exponentially decaying distinguishing probability. Using the
results of this subsection, it will be sufficient to prove the impossibility of one of them, and we
will get the impossibility of the other versions almost for free. Here we present the statements and
protocols for the different constructions, while the full security proofs (including the spacetime
stamps of messages) can be found in Appendix C.2. Firstly, the statements of the equivalences.
Box 3.1: Equivalence of Oblivious Transfer primitives




-oblivious transfer OT can be perfectly
constructed from the randomized oblivious transfer ROT . The constructing protocol Π1
(Definition 3.8) and the simulators σ1A, σ1B are classical and use only O(1) elementary,
local operations and classical communication.
Lemma 3.5 (Construction OT → ROT ). The randomized oblivious transfer ROT can




-oblivious transfer OT . The constructing protocol Π2
(Definition 3.9) and the simulators σ2A, σ2B are classical and use only elementary, local
operations and classical communication.





-oblivious transfer OT . The constructing protocol Π3 (Definition 3.10)
and the simulators σ3A, σ3B are classical and use only elementary, local operations and clas-
sical communication.





OT can be e−Ω(k)-constructed from 3k instances of Rabin’s oblivious transfer OT R. The
constructing protocol Π4 (Definition 3.11) and the simulators σ4A, σ4B are classical, run in
O(k) time, use O(k) space and O(k) bits of classical communication.
The explicit protocols for the constructions are all very simple, except for the last one, which
requires linear resources.
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Definition 3.8 (Protocol Π1 for ROT → OT ). The following protocol Π1 = (Π1A,Π1B) uses one





(1) Alice is given a0, a1, and Bob is given b.
(2) Bob inputs b to the randomized OT, obtaining sb.
(3) Alice encrypts ai using a one-time pad with key si, and sends both encrypted bits c0, c1 to
Bob.
(4) Bob will be able to decrypt only cb as he received only sb, but not s1−b. Thus, he can decrypt
and output ab.
Definition 3.9 (Protocol Π2 for OT → ROT ). The protocol Π2 = (Π2A,Π2B) uses an instance of(2
1
)
-oblivious transfer to construct a randomized oblivious transfer. In the protocol, honest Alice
simply inputs two bits chosen uniformly at random to the OT as a0, a1, and outputs them also to
her outer interface.
Definition 3.10 (Protocol Π3 for OT → OT R). The protocol Π3 = (Π3A,Π3B) constructs a Rabin




-oblivious transfer and works as follows:
(1) Both Alice and Bob choose a uniformly random bit (b∗ and b, respectively);




-OT is executed, where Alice sets ab∗ = x (x is the input of the Rabin
OT), and chooses a1−b∗ at random. Bob picks ab.
(3) Alice reveals b∗ to Bob.
(4) Bob checks whether b = b∗, and determines whether he received the bit x or a uniformly
random bit. In the latter case, ⊥ will be returned to the outer interface.
Definition 3.11 (Protocol Π4 for OT R → OT [22]). Fixed a security parameter k, the protocol




-oblivious transfer using 3k instances of Rabin oblivious transfer
and works as follows:
(1) Alice chooses 3k bits s1, . . . , s3k uniformly and independently at random, and sends them to
Bob using the 3k instances of Rabin OT;
(2) We say that a subset I ⊆ [3k] with |I| = k is completely known if Bob knows si for every
i ∈ I. Bob chooses a completely known subset as Ib, and chooses another subset of k bits as
I1−b, disjoint from Ib at random. At this point, (I0, I1) is sent to Alice.






Note that Bob can compute
⊕
j∈I sj if and only if I is completely known (otherwise, he learns
no information).





main idea there is that, with very high probability, Bob will have enough bits to create a completely
known subset, but not enough to create two of them. Therefore, he will be able to retrieve ab but
not a1−b. Note that the construction of Lemma 3.7 is different from the other two constructions
we presented in this section: first of all, the honest protocol may fail completely, in the sense that
there is a (small) probability that Bob cannot retrieve either of a0, a1, and this is captured in the
proof by the non-zero distinguishing advantage of the honest construction. Secondly, there is a
small chance that Bob can cheat, namely when the number of bits received from the Rabin OTs
exceeds 2k (in this case he can retrieve both a0, a1 by constructing two disjoint completely known
subsets), and this is a consequence of the imperfection of the simulation of σ4B against dishonest
Bob. However, in the security proof we bound both these ‘imperfections’ with a term e−Ω(k),
and one can obtain an exponentially small cheating/failure probability by linearly increasing the
security parameter k.
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3.3 Impossibility of composable Oblivious Transfer
In this section we present our proof of impossibility for oblivious transfer. The idea of the proof
here is similar to the one given by Vilasini et al. [6] for the impossibility of coin flip: we use
this to prove that constructing ROT is impossible, then Lemma 3.5 will extend the result to
OT . Then, we will turn our attention to Rabin’s oblivious transfer: in principle, one can use
Lemma 3.7 to entail its impossibility from the impossibility of the other two versions. However,
the distinguishing advantages would be poor, and decaying with respect to the security parameter k
of the construction. Instead, we will first present a generalization of the Rabin’s oblivious transfer,
and then prove its impossibility directly. The complete proofs can be found in Appendix C.3.
Box 3.2: Impossibility of randomized and 1-out-of-2 OT
Theorem 3.12 (Impossibility of ROT ). For any ε < 112 , it is impossible to ε-construct
ROT between two mutually distrusting parties with a mere exchange of messages, be it
classical, quantum, non-signalling or relativistic. A distinguisher achieving this advantage
has the same computational requirements as the protocol or the simulators.
Sketch of proof. Suppose we have a two-party protocol Π = (ΠA,ΠB) ran by Alice and Bob
such that, for some ε < 112
ΠAΠB ≈ε ROT (3.1)
ΠB ≈ε σAROTA (3.2)
ΠA ≈ε ROTBσB (3.3)
By applying the composability properties of the resources guaranteed by the Abstract Cryp-
tography framework, we obtain
ROTBσBσAROTA ≈3ε ROT
We reach a contradiction by exhibiting a simple distinguisher D attacking this last con-
struction with advantage at least 14 , implying 3ε ≥
1
4 .
Corollary 3.13 (Impossibility of OT ). For any ε < 112 , it is impossible to ε-construct OT
between two mutually distrusting parties with a mere exchange of messages, be it classical,
quantum, non-signalling or relativistic. A distinguisher achieving this advantage has the
same computational requirements as the protocol or the simulators.
Proof. Follows directly from the impossibility of ROT (Theorem 3.12) along with the per-
fect construction OT Π
2
−→ ROT (Lemma 3.5).
We would like to point out that these results (and the subsequent ones) do not only include
information-theoretic secure constructions of OT, but also computationally secure ones: as men-
tioned in Section 2, it all depends on the class of distinguishers D we consider when we state
Equations (3.1)–(3.3). Since we then exhibit a distinguisher D that is classical and efficient (it
only needs three bits of memory and one comparison), the impossibility holds as long as we consider
a class D containing D. Vilasini et al. [6] show how to derive three explicit distinguishers from D,
each attacking one of the three constructions required by Definition 2.4, with the same complexity
requirements as the protocol or the simulators. We omit this detail here for conciseness. Now, as
explained above, we need to provide a direct result for the impossibility of Rabin OT and, in the
meanwhile, we take the chance to make a more general statement. First we derive a generalization
of Rabin’s OT (which reduces to it for p = 12 , OT
1/2 ≡ OT R).
Definition 3.14 (Probabilistic transfer). A p-Rabin Oblivious Transfer (or probabilistic transfer)
is a primitive OT p = (OT p, OT pA, OT
p
B). Alice sends a bit x, and Bob receives x with probability p
(and ⊥ otherwise).
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Box 3.3: Impossibility of probabilistic OT
Theorem 3.15 (Impossibility of OT p). For any ε < 16p(1 − p), it is impossible to ε-
construct OT p between two mutually distrusting parties with a mere exchange of messages,
be it classical, quantum, non-signalling or relativistic. A distinguisher achieving this ad-
vantage has the same computational requirements as the protocol or the simulators.
We would like to highlight an intuition formalized by this result: when p = 0 or p = 1, the theorem
becomes meaningless, as OT 1 is the identity resource, and OT 0 is a resource blocking any incoming
message, which can be both constructed. As the information about the delivery of the bit becomes
more and more hidden from Alice (i.e. p→ 12 ), the impossibility becomes more and more evident.
The reader may also wonder why we did not simply use Theorem 3.15 along with the perfect
constructions of Lemmas 3.6 and 3.4 in order to prove the impossibility of OT and ROT . The
reason is that we would obtain a slightly weaker result: Theorem 3.12 proves impossibility up to
ε = 112 , while here we could only show the one for OT
R up to ε = 124 .
3.4 Impossibility of Oblivious String Transfer and Multi-Party Computation
In the literature, oblivious transfer primitives are also intended for multiple bit strings [1]: let
OT s,ROT s,OT p,s be an extension of OT ,ROT ,OT p where, instead of bits, strings of s bits are
transferred1. For these primitives, stronger impossibility results can be proven. The equivalence
given by the constructions of Lemmas 3.4–3.7 are naturally extended to the s-bit case. The proofs
of this section can be found in Appendix C.4.
Box 3.4: Impossibility of oblivious string transfer




, it is impossible to
ε-construct ROT s between two mutually distrusting parties with a mere exchange of mes-
sages, be it classical, quantum, non-signalling or relativistic. A distinguisher achieving this
advantage has the same computational requirements as the protocol or the simulators.
The perfect construction of Lemma 3.5 extends the bound also to OT s. Also the impossi-
bility for Rabin OT is extended:




p(1− p), it is impossible
to ε-construct OT p,s between two mutually distrusting parties with a mere exchange of
messages, be it classical, quantum, non-signalling or relativistic. A distinguisher achieving
this advantage has the same computational requirements as the protocol or the simulators.
These two results tell us that the impossibility bound grows exponentially fast for an oblivious
transfer of elements carrying s bits of information. In particular, if we let s → ∞, allowing
arbitrarily large strings, the bound becomes as high as 16 (for ROT
s and OT s) and 13p(1− p) (for
OT p,s).
Since we proved that oblivious transfer is impossible, the only remaining question to address is
whether arbitrary multi-party computation is also impossible, or there may be another complete
primitive that is constructible in the relativistic quantum setting. In this section we show, with the
same technique as above, that even composably secure two-party computation of a simple boolean
function such as the and of two bits is impossible to construct. Appendix C.5 contains the proof
for the claim below.
Definition 3.18. Let f : {0, 1}m+n → {0, 1}r be a boolean function. A two-party computation of
f is a primitive Cf = (Cf , CfA, C
f
B). Alice inputs x ∈ {0, 1}m and Bob inputs y ∈ {0, 1}n. Both
receive the value f(x, y), but none of them can retrieve information about the input given by the
other party (aside from what can be inferred by the final value).
1Formally, Alice sends elements of a set X , with |X | = 2s: for this purpose, s does not need to be an integer, so






(f(x, y), QB) PA, PB ≺ QA, QB
We define the function and : {0, 1}2 → {0, 1} where and(x, y) = x · y.
Box 3.5: Impossibility of multi-party computation
Theorem 3.19 (Impossibility of multi-party and computation). For any ε < 112 , it is
impossible to ε-construct Cand between two mutually distrusting parties with a mere ex-
change of messages, be it classical, quantum, non-signalling or relativistic. A distinguisher
achieving this advantage has the same computational requirements as the protocol or the
simulators.
With a similar argument, one can prove that also a multi-party computation of the or
function is impossible.
3.5 Mutual constructions between Oblivious Transfer and Bit Commitment
We conclude this work by reviewing the formal definition of bit commitment, and proving that
composably secure commitment and oblivious transfer primitives can be constructed from each
other in the relativistic quantum setting. The error probability decays exponentially on the re-
sources used. This sort of equivalence allows us to extend results on minimal assumptions for
composable bit commitment (such as the one by Prokop [23]) also to oblivious transfer. Moreover,
the equivalence lemmas proved in Section 3.2 extend the argument to every version of the oblivious
transfer primitive.
Definition 3.20. A bit commitment is a primitive BC = (BC,BCA, BCB). Alice commits to a bit
x at position P , Bob is notified about the commitment but does not receive any information about






P ≺ P ′
Q ≺ Q′
We include in this definition the possibility for Alice to never open the commitment (or, equiva-
lently, to abort it). Here we present the Unruh’s construction BC → OT [3], translated to the AC
framework. The security proof gives a probabilistic analysis of cheating behaviour (Appendix C.4).
Box 3.6: Constructions between bit commitment and oblivious transfer
Lemma 3.21 (Construction BC → OT ). OT can be e−Ω(n)-constructed from 2n instances
of BC. The constructing protocol Π5 (Definition 3.23) and the simulators are quantum, run
in time O(n) and use O(n) space.
Lemma 3.22 (Construction OT → BC). BC can be 2−k-constructed from k instances of
OT . The constructing protocol Π6 (Definition 3.24) and the simulators are classical, run
in time O(k) and use O(k) space.
Definition 3.23 (Protocol for BC → OT [3]). Given fixed security parameters n, k, h with n =
k + h and k, h = Θ(n) (e.g. k = h = n2 ), the protocol Π5 = (Π5A,Π5B) uses 2n instances of bit




-oblivious transfer. It works as follows:
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(1) Alice chooses n bits xi ∈ {0, 1} and n measurement bases θi ∈ {X,Z} uniformly at random.
Then, according to the random choices, she creates n BB84 states
|ψi〉 = |xi〉θi ∈ {|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉}.
(2) These states are sent to Bob, which chooses θ̄i ∈ {X,Z} uniformly at random, and measures
|ψi〉 using θ̄i for every i. Let x̄i be the results of the measurements.
(3) Bob uses the 2n instances of BC to commit to θ̄i and x̄i.
(4) Alice chooses a test set T ⊆ [n], |T | = h uniformly at random, and sends it to Bob which, in
turn, opens the commitments of x̄i, θ̄i for each i ∈ T (and aborts the others).
(5) Denoting S ⊆ [n] as the subset of states with θi = θ̄i, Alice checks xi = x̄i for every i ∈ S∩T .
If the test fails, Alice aborts. Otherwise, she continues with the protocol by sending θi to Bob,
for every i ∈ R := [n] \ T .
(6) Bob now has |R| = k bits that were not used in the test, and each of them was correctly
measured with probability 12 . We use these k bits to construct two subsets I0, I1 with |I0| =
|I1| = k3 as we did in Lemma 3.7. Bob will abort if X := |R ∩ S| <
k
3 (since he cannot
construct a completely known subset).
The test carried out in steps 3–5 is needed as a proof that Bob measured {|ψi〉}i before committing
to the outcomes of their measurements.
Definition 3.24 (Protocol for OT → BC). Given fixed security parameter k, the protocol Π6 =




-oblivious transfer to construct a bit commitment, and works as
follows:
(1) In the commit phase, Alice chooses bits s10, . . . , sk0 uniformly and independently at random,
and s11, . . . , sk1 such that si1 = si0 ⊕ x. Thus, x = si0 ⊕ si1 for every i ∈ [k].
(2) Bob chooses bits b1, . . . , bk uniformly and independently at random, and uses them to choose




-OT for every i. At this point, for every i,
Alice has no information about which of si0, si1 is known to Bob.
(3) During the opening phase, Alice sends all {s̄i0, s̄i1}i = {si0, si1}i to Bob, which will check
that they are consistent with what he received from the OT primitives in the commit phase.
Moreover, he checks that s̄i0 ⊕ s̄i1 are all equal for every i. If this test fails, Bob aborts.
Otherwise, Bob outputs x = s̄10 ⊕ s̄11 on its right interface.
4 Discussion
Summary of results. We proved impossibility of composable oblivious transfer and multi-party
computation in relativistic and quantum settings, and provided mutual constructions between
different versions of oblivious transfer and bit commitment. We did so in the abstract cryptography
framework [4], with cryptographic resources instantiated as causal boxes in Minkowski space [5, 6].
Minimal resources for oblivious transfer. This works dashes hopes to rely on relativistic
constraints to construct composably secure oblivious transfer, without further resources and as-
sumptions on the behaviour of agents. A next step would be to investigate precisely whether
there are weaker resources from which these primitives can be built. For example in [23] Prokop
introduces an ‘asymmetric quantum beamer’ (which sends Bob a series of BB84 qubits, and Alice
a limited classical description of the qubits produced) and shows that it can be used to build bit
commitment; our results imply that it can also be used to build oblivious transfer. It would be
interesting to investigate to which extent this resource is strictly weaker than bit commitment.
Cryptography under general relativity. The only aspect of relativity explored so far is the
limited speed of light in special relativity [6, 13, 14]. It would be interesting to extend the
theoretical framework to cover general relativity scenarios, like quantum superpositions of large
masses, which may cause true superpositions of causal orders. After all, learning which information-






Figure A.1: Example of a resource. The arrows represent inputs (pointing towards the box) and outputs
(pointing away from the box). These are the graphical representations of R (left) and αIR (right). In this
case, α is a converter with two inner interfaces (connected to the interfaces of R in the set I), and one outer
interface.
Appendix
A Abstract cryptography: formal definitions
In this Appendix we present a more formal review of the Abstract Cryptography framework [4]. In
a resource theory of cryptography, the resources are cryptographic primitives, like bit commitment
or key distribution. These can be composed along with others constructions (e.g. protocols, trusted
third parties) to construct new resources.
Definition A.1 (Component space [4]). A component space is a triple (Ω, ||, δ), where
• Ω is a set of resources;
• || is an operation on Ω called parallel composition;
• δ : Ω2 → R+0 is a pseudo-metric on Ω such that (Ω, δ) is a pseudo-metric space2.
For our purposes, a resource R ∈ Ω is an abstract system: a closed box with a number of
interfaces where inputs are read and outputs are delivered (Figure A.1). From a cryptographic
point of view, one can imagine a resource as a trusted device, where different parties connect to
different interfaces. First we need a space of resources and a measure of closeness between resources
that tells us how similar they are. This measure will be given an operational meaning later.
In the rest of the work, we use the notation R ≈ε S to denote that δ(R,S) ≤ ε and, if ε = 0, we
may also remove the subscript. The pseudo-metric satisfies the triangle inequality by definition,
and one can infer that: {
R ≈ε S
S ≈ε′ T
=⇒ R ≈ε+ε′ T.
Note that in this work, the pseudo-metric used is the statistical advantage with respect to a class
of distinguishers, dD.
Definition A.2 (Constructor space [4]). A constructor space is a triple (Γ, ◦, |), where
• Γ is a set of converters;
• ◦ is an operation on Γ called serial composition;
• | is an operation on Γ called parallel composition;
Here we define α ∈ Γ as a converter, which is an abstract system like the resources defined
above, with two sets of interfaces, one internal and one external. We can attach a converter to
a subset of interfaces of a resource. The notation αIR denotes a resource obtained by attaching
α to the set of interfaces I of R (Figure A.1). Throughout the rest of this work we will only
consider two-party settings, therefore we will denote as αRβ a resource obtained by attaching α to
the interfaces of the first party (Alice), and β to the interfaces of the second party (Bob). These
structures satisfy properties of general composability [4], which we will not discuss here.
2A pseudo-metric space is similar to a metric space, with the only difference that the identity of indiscernibles




Figure A.2: Graphical representation of the construction αRβ. The subset of interfaces the converters α, β
connect to will be usually omitted in the notation, as it will be clear from the context. For example, α, β




D[R] ∈ {0, 1}
Figure A.3: Graphical representation of a distinguisher D observing a resource R. D covers all the interfaces of
R and returns a bit on its outer interface. These usually represent attackers to our constructions, distinguishing
our protocols from ideal resources.
There is a third type of component, besides resources and converters, called distinguishers
(Figure A.3). These are special types of converters whose internal interfaces attach to all the
interfaces of a resource, while the external interface only outputs one bit. Given a resource R and
a distinguisher D, we have that D[R] is an indicator random variable, and this is important to
keep in mind when we define security. The definition of primitive and security with respect to a
class of distinguishers can be found in the main text.
Why is the construction of Definition 2.4 sufficient for security against dishonest
behaviour? Consider the following result:
Lemma A.3. Let D ∈ D be a distinguisher, and α ∈ Γ be a converter. Moreover, we denote with
Dα a distinguisher such that, for every R ∈ Ω:
Dα[R] ≡ D[αR]
If Dα ∈ D for every D ∈ D, the following holds:
R ≈ε S =⇒ αR ≈ε αS
Proof. We have that dD(R,S) ≤ ε. Therefore:
dD(αR,αS) = sup
D∈D
|P (Dα[R] = 1)− P (Dα[S] = 1)|
≤ sup
D∈D
|P (D[R] = 1)− P (D[S] = 1)|
= dD(R,S) ≤ ε
The inequality follows from the fact that, since Dα ∈ D, it is already considered in the sup of the
right-hand side.
The original paper [4] makes this property more precise by defining an algebra over (D,S): for
example, if we consider D as the set of polynomial-time distinguishers, the hypotheses of Lemma A.3
would be satisfied by any polynomial-time converter α. Let us consider the case of honest Bob
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and dishonest Alice (the other case is analogous): therefore Bob will run the honest protocol ΠB ,
while Alice may use a dishonest procedure (let us call it Π̄A). By applying Lemma A.3:
RAΠB ≈ε σASA =⇒ Π̄ARAΠB ≈ε Π̄AσASA
which means that Bob sees a behaviour that is statistically close to the one given by the ideal
resource on its interface.
Example. A very common attack on composable security is the man-in-the-middle attack, in
which the distinguisher runs another copy R′ of R in parallel and forwards messages between the
two resources, creating correlations between the outputs of the R and R′ that one would not obtain
from two copies of S, and therefore reaching dD(R,S) > 0. This is at the heart of impossibility
proofs for coin-flipping constructions [6], and also for the oblivious transfer primitives treated in
the present work.
B Overview of causal boxes
In this section we review the Causal Box framework [5]: causal boxes are powerful because they
can model information processing systems in great generality, for example allowing a superposition
of the order of messages, or order of messages that are defined during protocol runtimes. Moreover,
Portmann et al. [5] showed that Causal Boxes are closed under composition, a feature that is crucial
in order to guarantee the general composability properties required by the Abstract Cryptography
framework. Another important point is that the formalism allows us to instantiate Causal Boxes
in a Minkowski space-time, thus easily taking into account special relativity constraints for the
exchange of messages.
Message space and wires
We model an arbitrary message as a pair (v, t) ∈ V × T , where V is a message space and T is a
partially ordered set defining the order of the messages. If a message is encoded as a quantum
state, the Hilbert space of a single message is H = C|V| ⊗ l2(T ), where l2(T ) = span{|t〉}t∈T .
Therefore, H is spanned by the basis {|v, t〉}v∈V,t∈T .
A causal box receives its inputs and outputs through wires, which can carry any number of
messages of fixed dimension, or even a superposition of them. The dimension of such messages
defines the dimension of the wire: for example, a two-dimensional wire (|V| = 2) can send any
number of qubits one after the other (or, again, in superposition) but it cannot carry a qutrit.
Hence, we can model a d-dimensional wire as a (bosonic) Fock space:
F(Cd ⊗ l2(T )) := span{|Ω〉} ⊕
∞⊕
n=1
∨n(Cd ⊗ l2(T ))
where ∨nH denotes the symmetric subspace of H⊗n and |Ω〉 is the vacuum state, which represents
that no messages are sent through the wire. We take the symmetric subspaces because we want
|(m1, t1), (m2, t2)〉 ≡ |(m2, t2), (m1, t1)〉, i.e. the order of messages is already induced by the ele-
ments of T . Also wires are proven to be composable [5]: if we have two wires with Fock spaces
FA,FB , of dimensions dA, dB , these will be equivalent to a single wire with Fock space FA ⊗FB .
Moreover, since
F(HA)⊗F(HB) ' F(HA ⊕HB)
with HA = CdA ⊗ l2(T ),HB = CdB ⊗ l2(T ), this new wire has dimension d = dA + dB . Notice
that the above isomorphism also allows us to conclude the opposite: any wire of dimension d can
















Figure B.1: Example of a cut C in a finite set T with a partial order. Here C is the set of all points on the left
of the dashed line. The highlighted points form the minimal frontier of the cut: all points in the cut are in their
causal past.
Cuts and causality
Now we would like to formalize a reasonable notion of causality which will be satisfied by causal
boxes. First we need to define a cut: we can think of it as a partition through space-time where
we only consider the points that came before the ‘cut’ (Figure B.1).
Definition B.1 (Cut [5]). Given a partially ordered set T , a cut is a subset C ⊆ T such that, for





where T ≤t := {p ∈ T | p ≤ t}. A cut is said to be bounded if there is t ∈ T such that C ⊆ T ≤t.
Moreover, we denote the set of all cuts in T with C(T ), and the set of all bounded cuts with C̄(T ).
We can call the set of points P the frontier of the cut C. Notice that it is not unique for a
cut: indeed any P ′ with P ⊆ P ′ ⊆ C is a valid frontier of C. Indeed, one can see that, for finite T ,
the minimal frontier of the cut is a vertex cut of the digraph defined by the order (Figure B.1). A





Now we introduce a causality function, which defines a sort of gap between the positions
of inputs and outputs of information processing tasks: an output at positions in C ∈ C(T ) must
necessarily be caused only by inputs in its causal past, that is at positions in χ(C) ( C. For example,
if we take T = Q (equipped with its natural order), a gap of δ > 0, namely χ((−∞, x]) = (−∞, x−δ]
will satisfy Definition B.2, and it imposes a time gap of at least δ between inputs and correlated
outputs.
Definition B.2 (Causality function [5]). A function χ : C(T ) → C(T ) is said to be a causality
function if the following conditions hold:
(1) For any two cuts C,D ∈ C(T ), χ(C ∪ D) = χ(C) ∪ χ(D);
(2) For any two cuts C,D ∈ C(T ), C ⊆ D =⇒ χ(C) ⊆ χ(D);
(3) For any cut C ∈ C(T ) \ {∅}, χ(C) ( C;
(4) For any cut C ∈ C(T ) and t ∈ T , ∃n ∈ N such that t 6∈ χn(C).
where χn = χ ◦ · · · ◦ χ applies the function n times.
Note that Conditions (1) and (2) guarantee consistency: if an output on C can be computed
only from inputs on χ(C), and an output on D can be computed only from inputs on χ(D), then
outputs on C ∪D can be computed only from inputs in χ(C)∪χ(D). Moreover, if inputs from χ(C)
are available to compute an output on C, then they must also be available to compute any output
on D ⊇ C.
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Condition (4) is necessary to avoid ill-defined systems: consider T = Q+ and a system out-
putting in position 1 − t/2 from an input in position 1 − t for every 0 < t ≤ 1. This corresponds
to a causality function χ([0, 1 − t/2]) = 1 − t which satisfies conditions (1)-(3). However, setting
the initial position to 0 and looping back the output to the input produces an infinite amount of
messages before position 1 is reached, namely 1− 1/2n. The problem here is that the gap between
input and output tends to 0, and condition (4) imposes that a position t goes out of the possible
input positions after a finite number of steps.
Definition of causal box
We are now ready to define a causal box:
Definition B.3 (Causal box [5]). A (dX , dY )-causal box Φ with input wire dimension dX and
output wire dimension dY is a set of completely positive trace-preserving maps
Φ =
{
ΦC : S(Fχ(C)X )→ S(FCY )
}
C∈C̄(T )
for some causality function χ(C), satisfying mutual consistency, i.e.
ΦC = ΦC ◦ trT \χ(C)
ΦC = trD\C ◦ ΦD
for any two cuts C,D ∈ C(T ) with C ⊆ D. Here, S(H) denotes the density operator space over H
and trH denotes the partial trace operator over H.
Mutual consistency imposes that the map ΦC acting on the cut C should ignore any information
that is not in χ(C). Moreover, for any two cuts C ⊆ D, tracing out any output from ΦD arriving
at positions in the gap D \ C should give the same result as ΦC . The original paper by Port-
mann et al. [5] also extends Choi-Jamiołkowski and Stinespring representations to Causal Boxes.
Abstract Cryptography in the relativistic quantum setting
We can now concretely define the abstract systems behind the resources, converters, and distin-
guishers presented in Appendix A above as Causal Boxes. In the rest of their work, Portmann et
al. [5] also provide general composition operations between Causal Boxes, proving the properties
required by Maurer and Renner [4] in order to guarantee the desired general composability prop-
erties of the framework. Moreover, a pseudo-metric δ defining statistical distance between Causal
Boxes is provided in the same work. The last element to instantiate is the partially ordered set T
used to define causality. In order to model relativistic effects, we use the following:
Definition B.4 (Minkowski space-time). A Minkowski space-timeM' R4 is a four-dimensional
space where a point P ∈M is a tuple P = (~x, t) of a position ~x in space and a timestamp t.
We define a causal order ≺ on the space-time: we say that P = (~xP , tP ) is in the causal past
of Q = (~xQ, tQ) (i.e. P ≺ Q) if and only if the following holds:
||~xQ − ~xP ||2 ≤ c · (tQ − tP ),
where c is the speed of light.
In other words, light can reach ~xQ from ~xP in time tQ − tP . One can see that this order can
be used to define a causality function satisfying Definition B.2. Different parties in a relativistic
protocol should negotiate a common reference frame in order to not have ambiguities in representing
the space-time points. However, it is important to notice that security does not depend on the
chosen frame, as it will only depend on the causal order ≺ defined above, which is invariant under
Lorentz transformations. From now on, along with messages, we will also specify the timestamp
of the position in the space-time in which they are sent. This completes our framework, since
Causal Boxes instantiated with a Minkowski space-time not only model quantum effects3, but also
relativistic ones.











Figure B.2: Graphical representation of (1D) Minkowski space-time. The horizontal axis x is one dimension
of space, and the vertical axis t is time. Each point in the space generates a causal cone (its future light cone),
whose slope is exactly the speed of light c. In the figure, R is in the intersection of the future light cones of P
and Q, thus it is in the causal future of both points.
C Proofs of all results
C.1 Probability theory results used in proofs
C.1.1 Concentration bounds
These results are used in the proofs of Lemma 3.7 and Theorem 3.21.
Theorem C.1 (simplified Chernoff bound, relative error [24]). Let X1, . . . , Xn be independent
indicator random variables defined under a probability space (Ω,F ,P). Defining X =
∑
iXi and
µ = E [X], the following bounds hold:
P (X ≥ (1 + δ)µ) ≤ e−δ
2µ/3
P (X ≤ (1− δ)µ) ≤ e−δ
2µ/2
Theorem C.2 (Hoeffding’s inequality for hypergeometric distributions [25]). Let H be an hyper-
geometric random variable representing h extractions without replacement with x initial success
objects over n total objects defined under a probability space (Ω,F ,P). The following bounds hold
for 0 < t < xn :
P (H ≤ E [H]− th) ≤ e−2t
2h
P (H ≥ E [H] + th) ≤ e−2t
2h
C.1.2 Bounds for distinguishing advantages
These two lemmas are extensively used across all the proofs in order to bound distinguishing
advantages. The first lemma tells us that, if two systems are perfectly indistinguishable unless
an observable event Z happens, the statistical distance of any distinguisher is bounded by the
probability of such event.
Lemma C.3 (Difference lemma). Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space, and consider three events
X,Y, Z ∈ F such that P (X ∩ ¬Z) = P (Y ∩ ¬Z). The following bound holds:
|P (X)− P (Y )| ≤ P (Z)
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Proof.
|P (X)− P (Y )| = |P (X ∩ Z) + P (X ∩ ¬Z)− P (Y ∩ Z)− P (Y ∩ ¬Z)|
= |P (X ∩ Z)− P (Y ∩ Z)|
= P (Z) |P (X |Z)− P (Y |Z)| ≤ P (Z)
The second lemma is used when we want to tell apart two systems: if an event Z can happen
only in one of the two systems, then the distinguishing advantage of a distinguisher which outputs
1 if and only if Z occurs will be at least the probability of Z.
Lemma C.4 (Statistical separation lemma). Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space, and consider
X,Y, Z ∈ F such that Z ⊆ X and X ∩ Y = ∅. The following bound holds:
|P (Z |X)− P (Z |Y )| ≥ P (Z)
Proof.
|P (Z |X)− P (Z |Y )| = |P (Z |X)− 0| = P (Z ∩X)
P (X) ≥ P (Z ∩X) = P (Z)
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C.2 Equivalence of Oblivious Transfer primitives




-oblivious transfer OT can be perfectly con-
structed from the randomized oblivious transfer ROT . The constructing protocol Π1 (Defini-
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′′ ≺ Q0, Q1 and PB ≺ P ′′B
Figure C.1: Construction of a 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer from a Randomized Oblivious Transfer (Lemma 3.4).
Alice encrypts a0, a1 with a One-Time Pad, and sends them to Bob. Bob only receives one of the two keys.
Proof. When we provide a construction we need to argue that the three conditions imposed by
Definition 2.4 hold (in this case, with ε = 0 since we claim perfect construction).
Honest protocol Π1AROT Π1B ≈ OT (Figure C.1(a)). One can see that, under honest assumption,




-oblivious transfer via a simple one-time pad protocol by Alice. Thus,
the honest construction is indistinguishable from OT .
Simulation against dishonest Alice ROTAΠ1B ≈ σ1AOTA (Figure C.1(b)). The simulator σ1A re-
ceives s0, s1, c0, c1 on its left interface (recall that ROTA allows dishonest Alice to choose s0, s1),
and has to output a0, a1 in such a way that ab = cb⊕sb. To achieve this, σ1A simply sets ai = si⊕ci.
Simulation against dishonest Bob Π1AROTB ≈ OTBσ1B (Figure C.1(c)). The simulator σ1B receives
b on its right interface and it will have to output sb, c0, c1. In order to have indistinguishability in
this case we need to see cb = ab ⊕ sb and sb uniformly random. The other ciphertext c1−b, on the
other hand, can be simply extracted at random, since s1−b does not appear anywhere in the outer
interfaces.
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-oblivious transfer OT . The constructing protocol Π2 (Definition 3.9)












s0, s1 ← Be(1/2)




























s0, s1 ← Be(1/2)








Figure C.2: Construction of a Randomized Oblivious Transfer from a 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer (Lemma 3.5).
Alice chooses s0, s1 uniformly at random, and uses an instance of the 1-out-of-2 OT to send them to Bob.





(honest) Alice picks a0, a1 uniformly at random. Π2B , as well as σ2A, σ2B , simply act as identity
(forwarding messages). The construction is summarized in Figure C.2. It is worth noticing that





itself) is important for this construction to work.
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-oblivious transfer OT . The constructing protocol Π3 (Definition 3.10) and the



























































Q′′, PB ≺ Q ≺ S




-OT (Lemma 3.6). Honest Alice chooses at random in
which interface to insert x, and honest Bob chooses at random which of the two bits to receive.
Proof. Honest protocol Π3AOTΠ3B ≈ OTR (Figure C.3(a)). Note that ⊥ will be returned if and
only if b∗ 6= b, and this happens with probability exactly 12 . Thus, Bob will output x on its outer
interface with this probability, exactly like the ideal Rabin OT.
Simulation against dishonest Alice OTAΠ3B ≈ σ3AOTRA (Figure C.3(b)). The simulator σ3A takes
the bits a0, a1, b∗ as inputs on its left interface and, in order to achieve perfect construction, it can
output x = ab∗ to OTRA .
Simulation against dishonest Bob Π3AOTB ≈ OTRB σ3B (Figure C.3(c)). Bob’s simulator σ3B takes
as input either x or ⊥ on the left interface: if x is received, we output b∗ = b and ab = x, otherwise,
⊥ is received, and we set b∗ = 1− b, choosing ab uniformly at random.
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can be e−Ω(k)-constructed from 3k instances of Rabin’s oblivious transfer OT R. The constructing
protocol Π4 (Definition 3.11) and the simulators σ4A, σ4B are classical, run in O(k) time, use O(k)




















































































′ ≺ T0, T1 and S′i, X ≺ T0, T1




-Oblivious Transfer from 3k instances of Rabin Oblivious Transfer (Lemma 3.7).
Proof. For the rest of the proof, let OTR∗ = OTR1 || · · · ||OTR3k be the parallel composition of the 3k
instances of the Rabin OT (notice that it is also the same under dishonest Alice and Bob).
Honest protocol Π4AOTR∗ Π4B ≈e−Ω(k) OT (Figure C.4(a)). The only problem with the honest
protocol arises when Bob receives too few bits from the Rabin OTs: if the number X of received
bits is less than k, Bob will abort4, as it will not be possible for him to construct a completely known
4It is important that this check is done before Alice sends (t0, t1). Otherwise, in a context where the protocol is
repeated upon abortion, Bob can abort after learning a0, and then ask for b = 1 in the next iteration.
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subset. If X exceeds 2k, then two disjoint subsets can be constructed, and Bob would be able to
know both a0, a1 (this is not a problem for the honest protocol). However, X ∼ Binom(3k, 12 ),
and by a multiplicative Chernoff bound (Theorem C.1) we obtain:









Since the protocol and the ideal OT are indistinguishable unless X < k, the difference lemma
(Lemma C.3) gives us that the above probability is an upper bound for the distinguishing advantage
of any distinguisher.
Simulation against dishonest Alice OTR∗ Π4B ≈ σ4AOTA (Figure C.4(b)). σ4A takes the bits s1, . . . , s3k,
and it should output (I0, I1). In order to do this:
(1) It activates each incoming si with probability 1/2 (simulating the failure/success of the Rabin
OT), then it selects I0, I1 accordingly (unless X < k, in which case σ4A aborts exactly like
Π4B). This is to emulate the choice of the subsets made by Π4B .
(2) It computes ai = ti ⊕ (
⊕
j∈Ii sj) (remember that all si are known to σ
4





-OT on its right interface.
This simulation is perfectly indistinguishable from OTR∗ ΠB .





-OT on its left interface.
(1) The simulator activates each si with probability 1/2 (again, in order to simulate the failure/-
success of the Rabin OT), outputting either ⊥ or a uniformly random bit.
(2) When (I0, I1) arrives, the simulator checks for disjointness and then checks which one of
them is completely known (the simulator knows it, as it chose which bits failed), and asks
for the according bit to the OT on the left.
(3) At this point, tb can be computed using the bit ab returned by the OT and the bits of the
interval Ib, while t1−b is chosen uniformly at random (since I1−b is not completely known,
no information about a1−b could be extracted anyway).
The construction is indistinguishable unless (I0, I1) are both completely known (in this case σ4B
lacks information to construct t1−b in step 3), but this can happen only if X ≥ 2k. By a Chernoff
bound:











Theorem 3.12 (Impossibility of ROT ). For any ε < 112 , it is impossible to ε-construct ROT
between two mutually distrusting parties with a mere exchange of messages, be it classical, quantum,
non-signalling or relativistic. A distinguisher achieving this advantage has the same computational

























































Figure C.5: Graphical representation of the proof of Theorem 3.12. The last construction is obtained by plugging
(b) and (c), and then applying (a) using the triangle inequality. The two simulators σBσA are merged into a
single simulator σBA.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction there is a two-party protocol Π = (ΠA,ΠB), ran by Alice and
Bob respectively, such that
ΠAΠB ≈ε ROT (C.1)
ΠB ≈ε σAROTA (C.2)
ΠA ≈ε ROTBσB (C.3)
for ε < 112 and some simulators σA, σB . By triangle inequality we can infer that:
ΠAΠB ≈2ε ROTBσBσAROTA by (C.2) + (C.3) (C.4)
ROT ≈3ε ROTBσBσAROTA by (C.1) + (C.4)
For simplicity, we now consider σBσA as a single simulator σBA. This does not hinder the cor-
rectness of the proof as we are simply quantifying over a broader set of simulators (σBA internally
simulates the exchange of messages between σB , σA). Hence, we found the following inequality:
3ε ≥ dD(ROT,ROTBσBAROTA)
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The construction, along with the names of the variables we are going to use for the rest of this
proof is given in Figure C.5. Now consider a distinguisher D which inputs a uniformly random bit
b′ on the right interface of ROTBσBAROTA and guesses the non-ideal resource if and only if it
observes sb′ 6= s′b′ . On the other side, ROTB will output uniformly random s0, s1. D will certainly
be able to distinguish the two systems if sb′ 6= s′b′ , which tells us, by the statistical separation
lemma (Lemma C.4):
3ε ≥ dD(ROT,ROTBσBAROTA) ≥ P (sb′ 6= s′b′)
We conclude the argument by finding a lower bound for this probability: assume without loss of
generality that Q ≺ P ′0, P ′1, i.e. sb is used by σBA for the choice of s′0, s′1 (otherwise, sb′ and s′b′
would be unconditionally independent and the claim would follow).
P (sb′ 6= s′b′) = P (sb′ 6= s′b′ | b = b′)P (b = b′) + P (sb′ 6= s′b′ | b 6= b′)P (b 6= b′)
= 12P (sb
′ 6= s′b′ | b = b′) +
1
2P (sb
′ 6= s′b′ | b 6= b′)
≥ 12P (sb
′ 6= s′b′ | b 6= b′)
When b 6= b′, ROTB will deliver sb to σBA, which is independent from s1−b = sb′ . Therefore,
σBA has to return to ROTA a bit that needs to match sb′ , of which it has no information and is
uniformly random. Therefore,
P (sb′ 6= s′b′ | b 6= b′) =
1
2
concluding that ε ≥ 112 for any possible causal order chosen by σBA and this leads to a contradiction.
This proof technique looks very ‘classical’, in the sense that no quantum information seems to
be involved. However, it is worth noticing that the initial assumption on the protocol Π is very
general, as includes any kind of protocol, also quantum, relativistic and non-signalling ones.
Theorem 3.15 (Impossibility of OT p). For any ε < 16p(1 − p), it is impossible to ε-construct
OT p between two mutually distrusting parties with a mere exchange of messages, be it classical,
quantum, non-signalling or relativistic. A distinguisher achieving this advantage has the same
computational requirements as the protocol or the simulators.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction there is a two-party protocol Π = (ΠA,ΠB), ran by Alice and
Bob respectively, such that
ΠAΠB ≈ε OT p
ΠB ≈ε σAOT pA
ΠA ≈ε OT pBσB
for ε < 16p(1 − p) and some simulators σA, σB . Following the exact same reasoning as in Theo-
rem 3.12, we obtain:
OT p ≈3ε OT pBσBAOT
p
A
Now, we take a distinguisher D which inputs xA chosen uniformly at random on the left interface
and compares it with the output xB received on the right interface, guessing the constructed
resource if and only if xA 6= xB . By the statistical separation lemma we have:
3ε ≥ dD(OT p, OT pBσBAOT
p
A) ≥ P (xA 6= xB)
We conclude the argument by finding a lower bound for this probability. Let E be the event where
OT pB fails (i.e. returns ⊥) and OT
p
















































Figure C.6: Graphical representation of the proof of Theorem 3.15. The last construction is obtained by plugging
(b) to (c), and then applying (a) using the triangle inequality. The two simulators σBσA are merged into a
single simulator σBA.
whenever E occurs, xB will be equal to what σBA gave on its right interface. However, since OT pB
failed, σBA received no information about xA, therefore:
P (xA 6= xB) = P (xA 6= xB |E)P (E) + P (xA 6= xB | ¬E)P (¬E)
≥ P (xA 6= xB |E)P (E)
= p(1− p) · P (xA 6= xB |E) =
1
2p(1− p)
which means that ε ≥ 16p(1− p). Contradiction.
C.4 Oblivious String Transfer




, it is impossible to ε-construct
ROT s between two mutually distrusting parties with a mere exchange of messages, be it classical,
quantum, non-signalling or relativistic. A distinguisher achieving this advantage has the same
computational requirements as the protocol or the simulators.
Proof. The proof is identical to the one given for Theorem 3.12, with the only difference that sb′ , s′b′
are strings of s bits. Therefore, if σBA does not receive information about sb′ , the probability that
the output on the right is different is:








p(1 − p), it is impossible to ε-
construct OT p,s between two mutually distrusting parties with a mere exchange of messages, be it
classical, quantum, non-signalling or relativistic. A distinguisher achieving this advantage has the
same computational requirements as the protocol or the simulators.
Proof. We follow the same reasoning as for Theorem 3.15, except for the fact that, when the event
E occurs, σBA needs to match a string of s bits instead of a single bit, which translates to:




Theorem 3.19 (Impossibility of multi-party and computation). For any ε < 112 , it is impossible
to ε-construct Cand between two mutually distrusting parties with a mere exchange of messages, be
it classical, quantum, non-signalling or relativistic. A distinguisher achieving this advantage has
the same computational requirements as the protocol or the simulators.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction there is a two-party protocol Π = (ΠA,ΠB), ran by Alice and
Bob respectively, such that
ΠAΠB ≈ε Cand
ΠB ≈ε σACandA
ΠA ≈ε CandB σB





















We consider a distinguisher D which inputs x, y′ chosen uniformly at random and guesses the
constructed resource if and only if xy 6= xy′ or x′y′ 6= xy′. By the usual application of the statistical
separation lemma:
3ε ≥ dD(CandB σBACandA , Cand) ≥ P (xy 6= xy′ ∨ x′y′ 6= xy′) .
Hence, we conclude the proof by finding a lower bound for this probability:
P (xy 6= xy′ ∨ x′y′ 6= xy′)
= 14P (xy 6= xy
′ ∨ x′y′ 6= xy′ |x = 0, y′ = 0) + 14P (xy 6= xy
′ ∨ x′y′ 6= xy′ |x = 0, y′ = 1)
+ 14P (xy 6= xy
′ ∨ x′y′ 6= xy′ |x = 1, y′ = 0) + 14P (xy 6= xy
′ ∨ x′y′ 6= xy′ |x = 1, y′ = 1)
= 14P (0 6= 0 ∨ 0 6= 0 |x = 0, y
′ = 0) + 14P (0 6= 0 ∨ x
′ 6= x |x = 0, y′ = 1)
+ 14P (y 6= y
′ ∨ 0 6= 0 |x = 1, y′ = 0) + 14P (y 6= y
′ ∨ x′ 6= x |x = 1, y′ = 1)
=14P (x
′ 6= x |x = 0, y′ = 1) + 14P (y 6= y
′ |x = 1, y′ = 0) + 14P (y 6= y
′ ∨ x′ 6= x |x = 1, y′ = 1) .
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Now, note that we can have Q′A ≺ PB or QB ≺ P ′A, but not both. Assume without loss of
generality Q′A 6≺ PB (the other case is analogous). Therefore, y cannot depend on xy′ (and, in
particular, is independent from y′) and the lower bound will become:
P (xy 6= xy′ ∨ x′y′ 6= xy′) ≥ 14P (y 6= y
′ |x = 1, y′ = 0) + 14P (y 6= y
′ |x = 1, y′ = 1)
= 12P (y 6= y
′ |x = 1) = 14 .
which gives us ε ≥ 112 for any possible choice of the causal order used by σBA. This leads to a
contradiction.
C.6 Oblivious Transfer and Bit Commitment
Lemma 3.21 (Construction BC → OT ). OT can be e−Ω(n)-constructed from 2n instances of BC.
The constructing protocol Π5 (Definition 3.23) and the simulators are quantum, run in time O(n)
and use O(n) space.
Proof. In the following analysis, let BC∗ = BC1|| · · · ||BC2n.
Honest protocol Π5ABC∗Π5B ≈e−Ω(n) OT (Figure C.7(a)). The test carried out by Alice to check
that Bob measured the states gives us no problems, since it will always succeed under assumption
of honest Bob. The only case where the honest construction diverges from the ideal OT is when















≤ e−Ω(k) = e−Ω(n)
using a Chernoff bound. This, along with an application of the difference lemma, completes the
honest construction.
Simulation against dishonest Alice BC∗Π5B ≈ σ5AOTA (Figure C.7(b)). Notice that σ5A internally
fakes the commitments, and thus will have complete control over the transmissions of x̄i and θ̄i:
(1) σ5A can avoid measuring {|ψi〉}i until it receives T . At this point only those in T are measured
with randomly chosen bases and their fake commitments are opened.
(2) When {θi}i∈R are received, they are used to correctly measure all the bits, allowing σ5A to
choose I0, I1 that are both completely known.
(3) σ5A received both a0, a1, and it can give them as input to the ideal OT.
This gives a perfect construction.
Simulation against dishonest Bob Π5ABC∗ ≈e−Ω(n) OTBσ5B (Figure C.7(c)). Also σ5B fakes the
commitments. Hence, it receives {x̄i, θ̄i}i immediately in the (fake) commit phase.
(1) The test is carried out normally, ignoring the additional information (if it fails, σ5B aborts
exactly like Π5A).
(2) When I0, I1 arrive, σ5B can deduce which of the two is completely known: if Ib is the com-





and choose t1−b uniformly at random.
The construction is indistinguishable unless I0, I1 are both completely known (in which case we let
σ5B abort). Suppose dishonest Bob avoids measuring x of the n states. Denote with X ′ the number
of correctly measured bits among the k′ ∈ [k − x, k] ones that were measured honestly (excluding
the ones used for the test). Thus, we have X ≤ X ′+x, with X ′ ∼ Binom(k′, 12 ) (the upper bound
is because also some of the x states might be used for the test). We now split into two cases:
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12 in order to have X ≥
2k
3 . By a Chernoff
bound, the probability that this happens is:
P
(



















′) = e−Ω(k) = e−Ω(n) since k′ ≥ 1112k
• if x > k12 , we want to argue that the event A in which Bob passes the test has negligible
probability. We analyze the number Z of bits among the x that were not measured which
are chosen to be in T by Alice. Then, each of these bits has 14 chance of being detected
by Alice (correct basis but wrong bit in the commitment). Therefore, the probability of A
conditioned on Z is





We conclude this analysis by bounding the probability that Z is low: notice that Z is an
hypergeometric random variable, taking h out of n elements without replacement, and x of











≤ e−2( x2n )
2
h = e−Ω(n)
Using the law of total probability we combine our results:



































= e−Ω(n) + e−Ω(n) = e−Ω(n)
The above argument tells us that dishonest Bob manages to cheat with probability at most e−Ω(n)
regardless of the number x of states he avoids measuring (even if x is randomized, we can use the
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P0, P1 ≺ Q′ ≺ T0, T1 and X ≺ P ′B ≺ Q
′




-OT from 2n instances of bit commitment (Theorem 3.21).
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Lemma 3.22 (Construction OT → BC). BC can be 2−k-constructed from k instances of OT . The






































P ≺ Sij ≺ T



























































































































Proof. In the construction given below, x is the input to the bit commitment andOT∗ = OT 1|| · · · ||OT k
is the parallel composition of the k instances of oblivious transfer.
Honest protocol Π6AOT∗Π6B ≈ BC (Figure C.8(a)). One can see that the honest protocol perfectly
constructs a bit commitment resource (under honest assumption, the test will never fail).
Simulation against dishonest Alice OT∗Π6B ≈2−k σ6ABCA (Figure C.8(b)). σ6A receives all si0, si1
immediately, as it simulates the oblivious transfers internally.
(1) σ6A commits to x = s10 ⊕ s11 on its right interface.
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(2) As soon as {s̄i0, s̄i1}i arrive for the opening phase, σ6A simulates the test done by Π6B by
checking only one of the two bits uniformly at random, for each pair, and also s̄i0⊕ s̄i1 = x for
every i. If this test succeeds, then σ6A opens the commitment on its right interface. Otherwise,
it aborts just like Π6B .
Notice that, when the test succeeds, OT∗Π6B computes the committed bit s̄10 ⊕ s̄11 from the bits
{s̄i0, s̄i1}i delivered during the opening phase, while σ6BBCA takes s10 ⊕ s11 from the bits delivered
during the commitment phase. Thus, the two systems are perfectly indistinguishable unless the
test succeeds with si0 ⊕ si1 6= s̄i0 ⊕ s̄i1, which means the bits {s̄i0, s̄i1}i sent during the opening phase
have one bit flipped for each pair, and these k flipped bits all avoid the test carried out by σ6A. In
this case, the bits outputted on the right interface are different in the two systems, but this happens
only with probability at most 2−k. Hence, the difference lemma concludes the construction.
Simulation against dishonest Bob Π6AOT∗ ≈ BCBσ6B (Figure C.8(c)). σ6B receives the bits b1, . . . , bk
on its right interface, as it also simulates the oblivious transfers internally.
(1) When the received signal arrives from the left interface, it returns sibi chosen uniformly at
random.
(2) As soon as the commitment on the left interface is open and σ6B receives x, it can simply
construct {s̄i0, s̄i1} accordingly, namely s̄ibi ← sibi , s̄i1−bi ← x⊕ sibi .
This last construction is perfect.
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